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In July–August 2020 Global Intellectual History published a collection of articles about
dynasty. Reading the guest editors’ introduction about the ‘invention’ of dynasty, I
was pleased to see several paragraphs discussing my work. My gratification turned to
bafflement after I noticed that it was presented as symptomatic for ‘ … academic
“common sense” which homogenizes global history into a history of dynasties, and
thus flattens heterogenous [sic] political systems into false resemblances’.1 This
unfounded interpretation demands a riposte, and I gladly use the opportunity granted
to me by Global Intellectual History. My response extends beyond the immediate
issues at stake and has a wider relevance for global history’s methodological quandaries.
Writing my Dynasties: A Global History of Power 1300–1800, and its brief 2019 sequel,
Dynasty: A Very Short Introduction, I fully anticipated sharp rebuke.2 My comparison
juxtaposes polities of all sizes and positions in world history: miniature African chief-
doms are considered in one breath with the Chinese empire. Moreover, I focus squarely
on comparison and mention connections only in passing. In short: I sin against accepted
guidelines of comparative history, and disregard the current dominance of the ‘con-
nected-entangled-croisée’ perspective in global history. Devotees of either of these two
paradigms, I surmised, will be critical. I welcome discussion about my choices. They
reflect the aspiration to move beyond the current stalemate of global history, where
the main paradigms seem to have settled into competing orthodoxies. These pages of
Global Intellectual History are disappointing to me not because they are sharply critical
of my work, but because the editors entirely miss the intellectual provocation inherent
in it.
So what has been the core of my initiative? My comparison was initially limited to
Europe and Asia. Taking seriously comments about my book proposal kindly provided
by anonymous readers of several leading presses, I chose to include Africa, the Americas,
and Austronesia. I had worked on ritual kingship in Africa and South-East Asia before
turning to the comparison of European early modern courts, and so could hazard to
accept the challenge. This decision changed the course of the project more radically
than I had anticipated. African examples, most notably African matrilineal practice,
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helped me to shift gears and fundamentally reconsider formats of dynastic power and
models of kingship worldwide. Barring the succession of kings’ sons (except in cases
of royal incest), matriliny complicates the concentration of power in the hands of a
small ruling house, and invites circulation of power. It blurs the distinctions between
rule by one, few, and many. Matriliny underlines inclusiveness and circulation rather
than exclusivity and concentration – the building blocks of patrilineal polities. Charting
the contrasts and overlappings of patrilineal and matrilineal succession, I could clarify
varying roles of women in the dynastic setup. This became another focal point of my
comparison. Hence the book cover: dowager-empress Mentewab of Ethiopia.
Milinda Banerjee and Ilya Afanasyev, the editors of the volume, have entirely missed
these fundamentals. Dynasties is taken as a confirmation of academic clichés. The verdict
is clearly stated: narratives such as mine ‘ … underplay the rich heterogeneity of political
systems present in different societies in centuries past, many of which were non-mon-
archic in nature. They also obscure the significance of hereditary authority in modern
political, social, and economic life.’3 The editors state that my ‘liberal teleology sees
the modern “Western” world as a democratic disruption of a millennial heritage of mon-
archic hierarchy’. I (or the hazy group of authors I seem to represent) paint an ‘ … exces-
sively conservative picture’.4 The outspoken position of the editors is underpinned by
references to four pages taken from the introduction and the conclusion of Dynasties,
cited wholly out of context. Let me give you a specimen of their citation technique:
Throughout history, rule by a single male figure has predominated [the editors skip four lines
about women and succession through the female line.] Chiefs, kings, and emperors reigned
over most polities across the globe for the last 10,000 years [the editors skip remarks
about small and mobile kinship based groups and ‘stateless’ societies, and jump to the
opening sentence of a next paragraph.] In whichever way royal leaders actually emerged
or represented their origins, the dynastic organisation of power lasted.5
After eviscerating my statement, the editors do little to investigate its empirical basis.
They move forward to underline that a view such as this ‘ … naturalizes “premodern”,
precolonial, or non-European politics as primordially hierarchical’,6 ignoring an explicit
remark on the page they cited, where I stress that hierarchy and dynasty have frequently
been used as a convenient rhetorical counterpoint to modern ‘egalitarian’ society.
Another long quote, now from the conclusion, gets similar treatment, not by cutting
key sentences, but by wilfully disregarding long qualifications on the same pages – as
well as the empirical detail provided on every page of the book.
Do I need to repeat that there are no grounds whatsoever for these assertions? Both
Dynasties and the concise but wider-ranging Very Short Introduction phrase misgivings
about facile dichotomies between East and West, North and South, premodern and
modern. I highlight continuities in the practices of power and families, and underline
the persistence of the dynastic impulse in the modern world (a chapter in the VSI
leads the reader to modern family businesses, ‘political families’, and authoritarian
rulers mimicking kingship). Adding insult to injury, the article of one of the editors,
Milinda Banerjee, presents various views as alternatives to ‘my’ position that could
easily have been gleaned from my work – though with a far more diverse and extended
empirical underpinning.7
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What is at stake here? Did terminology cause these bizarre misunderstandings?
‘What’s in a word?’, the author of a more thoughtful contribution to this collection
asks.8 Its editors associate current usage of the term ‘dynasty’ with hegemony and colo-
nialism. What does it mean for me? Not much. At an earlier point in my career, uncom-
fortable with the explicit European and Castiglionesque connotation of the term ‘court’, I
introduced ‘dynastic centre’ as a more open alternative. Writing the proposal for my
Dynasties book, I considered ‘academic’ titles such as ‘An anthropology of rulership’
or ‘A global social history of rulership’. My Cambridge editor was undoubtedly right
to point out that these arid titles would not help sales, and I complied. I have used the
term dynasty loosely, as an open term indicating sovereign power, without stipulating
heredity or any particular forms of succession – and certainly without subscribing to
the make-believe of continuity so prevalent in the history of dynastic power. Dynasty,
I write in the VSI, ‘ …was always a construction. It was the result of a volatile mixture
of cultural rules defining kinship, the vagaries of demography, and the attempt of families
to ensure their continuity in power’.9 On the same page, I discuss the history of the term
and its parallels in other languages (e.g. dawla, khandan, chao). I note that in Europe
‘house’ long was far more common, showing that dynasty started out as a term reserved
for Egypt and gradually expanded to include other ‘Oriental’ courts before it was adopted
by European royalty in the Sattelzeit and beyond – a point elaborated in greater detail by
Natalia Nowakowski in the current collection of articles.10
What might have triggered Banerjee and Afanasyev to assume that I pursue ‘ … the
project of conceiving the global history as the history of “dynasty”’?11 As a comparative
social historian of European courts with a background in anthropology, I have felt com-
pelled to accept the challenge to ‘go global’: am I culpable for not choosing to focus on ‘
… peasants, pastoralists, and other labouring actors’?12 In a recent Past & Present article
condescendingly alluded to in the introduction’s footnotes, I explicitly list ‘cities, villages,
armies, religious communities, hospitals’ as alternative foci for detailed global compara-
tive research.13 Clearly, these themes will need other researchers. My aim has been to
break through the intellectual deadlock of global history by proposing a renovated
form of comparative research, not to install dynasties as the master narrative of
history – a silly idea.
Why did the editors of this volume erect a straw man, instead of engaging with the
arguments and methods proposed in my book? I can only speculate. We have all experi-
enced the difficulties of bringing together mostly disparate contributions, a challenge
even more difficult for global historians than for area specialists. I understand, but
have tried to keep in check, the reflex to jump to the level of ambitious conceptual rheto-
rics as a way out of this predicament. Again, a detailed and sharply critical altercation
with my arguments would have been excellent – but it cannot be found in the introduc-
tion, in Banerjee’s overblown article, or in any of the other, more sensible, contributions.
Rather than stimulating the authors of the contributions to explicitly engage with shared
questions or paradigms, the editors seem to have opted for the conceptual-ideological
escape route. They present an opaque brew of Marxist, post-colonial, subaltern and
croisée truisms. Theirs is a modern form of ‘creating alterity’: we are on the right side,
look at the bad guys on the other side of the road! This tendency, alas, can repeatedly
be found in global history publications, though not usually at this rather crude level. It
represents the stalemate I alluded to earlier.
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Some of the editors’ assertions deserve a different type of answer. Let me outline two
final contentions related to the dominant presence of hierarchical thinking in premodern
history and to the question of the ‘instrumentality’ of royal propaganda. Banerjee repeat-
edly states that I woefully underrate the presence of peoples without any form of hier-
archical rule – a misunderstanding based on reading my choice to focus on dynastic
rule as the denial of ‘acephalous’ societies with relatively egalitarian, age and gender-
based hierarchies. Such forms, my book elaborates, persist to some extent in polities
with kings and queen-mothers, particularly in matrilineal contexts. An authoritative
recent statement in this field by Marshall Sahlins and David Graeber goes substantially
further, suggesting that notions of kingship and hierarchy are present in the cosmologies
even of egalitarian peoples and can indeed be seen as a constant in premodern world
history. This suggestion has been taken up in the powerful comparative examination
of religion and politics by Alan Strathern, another recent attempt to reconstitute com-
parison as a key method of global history.14 What I can easily observe is that rebellions
usually adopted royal champions (false or true, a thin line in any case): notwithstanding
endless bloodshed in dysfunctional dynastic houses and frequent popular rebellion, only
very few polities opted for different formats of power. Why? The answer is directly con-
nected to the next point.
Banerjee presents an unambiguous view of royal power: ‘the dynastic construction of
the political past and present was absolutely a creation of “top-down propaganda” and
“coercion” launched by states and ruling classes’.15 This statement mixes traditional
views of repraesentatio maiestatis with more advanced Gramscian ideas about manufac-
tured consent. While it is neither wrong nor false, it flattens historical experience into an
instrumental mode. Undoubtedly coercion was always present, yet it was never the sole
foundation of consolidated polities. To be sure, kings were quite aware of the impact of a
great show. Ceremonial specialists at the French court discussed special effects such as
lugubrious sounds, smoke and fire, specific colours.16 Courts comprised a range of arti-
sans and actors able to make this work. Was it all just make-believe? Of course not.
Famously, Clifford Geertz once inverted the labels, stating that ‘Power served pomp,
not pomp power’.17 Geertz’s provocation helped to make room for an anthropological
understanding of ritual among historians, for the immense power of mentalities, ideas,
images, and ritual performance. Was the mandate of heaven merely a trick to subdue
restive populations? After fighting his way to the throne, the Hongwu emperor or
Ming Taizu, himself an upstart, viewed the misbehaviour of his sons with trepidation,
expecting that the mandate would be taken away.18 The sense of divine choice limited
the freedom of kings, and left leeway to servants around them – a commonplace
notion at least since Frazer’s Golden Bough. Why not examine the complexity and the
inconsistencies in the behaviour of power holders as well as peoples in past and
present? This is what the Dynasties book tried to do:
The populace, however, was not necessarily swayed by the images emanating from the court.
They appraised dynastic power in their own categories, including fearful images of ruthless
tyrants as well as friendly paragons of virtue. Both the heroes and the villains supported the
edifice of dynastic power: the Janus-faced view allowed the populace to explain deviations
from ideals they approved of or in any case accepted as inevitable. A mixture of ideals,
rewards, and threats, proportioned differently for various social groups, kept together
dynastic realms.19
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Perhaps this riposte can open the way for another, more fruitful discussion: how to move
beyond the constraints inherent in the currently dominant paradigms of global history?
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